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A GROWING MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
BY FLOYD ABRAMS
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
The past year has been a remarkably positive one
for First Amendment commercial-speech interests
before the Supreme Court. Many followers of the
fate of commercial speech had feared the worst after
the Court granted a writ of certiorari from a
strikingly First Amendment-sensitive ruling of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. But in its
ruling in that case, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993), and in another,
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993), the Court
not only reaffirmed the value of commercial speech,
but also strengthened the protections afforded it in
previous decisions. This remained true
notwithstanding the Court's far less positive treatment
of a third commercial-speech case, United States v.
Edge Broadcasting, 61 U.S.L.W. 4759 (1993).
The disparity among the three cases should come
as no surprise. In the commercial-speech area, as
much as in any other in recent years, Supreme Court
opinions often fail to relate to one another at all. It
is as if there are two Supreme Courts in
commercial-speech cases: one pro and one con.
Unfortunately, this split has left both sides of the
debate with their own well of precedent from which
to draw, thus leaving the area one of continuing
unpredictability. This term has been no exception.
Justice Byron White's majority opinion in Edge-the
last of the three decisions handed down - simply
does not cite Discovery Network at all and refers to
Edenfield only once in passing.
Despite this lack of intertextual reference, each of
the Court's commercial-speech cases this term, as in
years past, involves an application of the same
four-part test first set forth in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557 (1980). Regarding truthful and
non-deceptive commercial speech, that test requires
an assessment of the seriousness of the government's
interest in regulating commercial speech and a
determination that the statute in question both directly
advances that interest and is no more extensive than
necessary to serve the interest. The final factor of
this test was refined in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469 (1989), where the Court stated that its
decisions do not require the legislature to choose the
least restrictive means available to regulate
commercial speech, but look instead to whether there
is a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's ends
and the regulatory means chosen to accomplish those
ends.
As a practical matter, it is commonplace in
applying this test for the first two elements to be
disposed of relatively quickly. Only rarely has the
Court been faced with speech it found to be wholly
untruthful or inherently misleading and, therefore,
outside the scope of First Amendment protection; and
there always seems to be some substantial
government interest or other behind a statute at issue.
Almost without exception, the Court's
commercial-speech cases -- including those decided
this term - thus turn on the third and fourth elements
of the Central Hudson analysis.
In terms of clarifying the nature and scope of the
protection of commercial speech. Discovery
Network is of enormous import. Practically every
line - indeed, every footnote - of Justice John Paul
Stevens' majority opinion brings to light some aspect
of commercial-speech law that is protective of speech
yet had been only half-visible under previous
decisions.
Several aspects of the Discovery Network opinion
merit particular attention. First, with respect to the
level of judicial scrutiny to which commercial-speech
regulations ought to be subject, the Court flatly
"rejected mere rational basis review, * explicitly
affirming the application of an intermediate level of
scrutiny.
Borrowing extensively from those parts of Fax that
offered some promise of future First Amendment
protection, the Court also made clear that the burden
of proof rests squarely on the state to justify its
regulation and that it must "affirmatively establish the
reasonable fit" required in the fourth prong of the
commercial-speech test. The Court then clarified the
nature of this burden by expanding upon what is
meant by a "reasonable fit." The Court concluded
that, although a given regulation need not be the least
restrictive means in order to pass constitutional
muster, "if there are numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
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commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between
ends and means is reasonable." This is the first time
since Fox set forth the reasonable-fit standard that the
Court has provided clear and significant guidance on
how to evaluate - or at least go about disproving -
such a fit.
The Discovery Network decision is no less
significant for its sensitivity to First Amendment
concerns than for its systematic fine-tuning of the
analytic framework applicable to commercial speech.
In essence, the Court held in Discovery Network that
commercial speech may not be treated differently
from non-commercial speech when the distinction
between the two "bears no relationship whatsoever to
the particular interests" asserted by the state.
Specifically, the Court found that Cincinnati's ban
on newsracks containing commercial handbills -- but
not those containing newspapers - was an
impermissible response to the city's "admittedly
legitimate interests" in aesthetics. Citing the fact that
"[each] newsrack, whether containing
[non-commercial] 'newspapers' or 'commercial
handbills,' is equally unattractive," the Court found
that the only reason the city's regulation failed to
reach non-commercial speech was the city's
misperception that since commercial speech was of
lesser value than non-commercial speech, it could be
separately regulated on grounds unrelated to the
commercial aspects of its message. In response, the
Court made clear that it was "unwilling to recognize
Cincinnati's bare assertion that the 'low value' of
commercial speech is a sufficient justification for its
selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing
'commercial handbills.'"
Preliminary to its consideration of the particular
commercial/non-commercial dichotomy in
Cincinnati's newsrack ordinance, the Court also
addressed the troubling question of how commercial
speech should be defined, concluding that "[this] very
case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category." Significantly, the Court revisited its
previous attempts to define commercial speech and
made clear that its much-debated decision in Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)
- which concluded that certain informational
pamphlets discussing the virtues of prophylactics
were properly viewed as commercial speech because
they were "conceded to be advertisements," "made
reference to a specific product," and were
disseminated for profit -- did not establish any easily
applied three-part test to determine if speech should
be deemed commercial. Instead, the Court in
Discovery Network found "noteworthy" the fact that,
in Bolger, it "did not simply apply" its then-current
definition of commercial speech in a mechanistic
fashion, but rather conducted a careful examination of
the speech at issue "to ensure that speech deserving
of greater constitutional protection [was] not
inadvertently suppressed."
Finally, Discovery Network is as noteworthy for
its celebratory tone as it is for the substance of its
analysis. Any decision that quotes from historian
Daniel Boorstein's The Americans: The Colonial
Experience to demonstrate that commercial speech is
a historically important means of "[enlarging] and
[enlightening] the public mind" can only be described
as a paean to commercial speech. Discovery
Network may well be the single most important
decision in this area of First Amendment law since
the landmark Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976), first expressly recognized the need for
constitutional protection of even purely commercial
speech.
The second of the three commercial-speech cases
this term, Edenfield v. Fane, involved a constitutional
challenge to a Florida statute banning in-person,
uninvited solicitation by certified public accounts.
The decision continued the supportive tone set by
Discovery Network and, along with Edge,M
furnished new insight into what is meant by Central
Hudson's third requirement that a regulation must
directly advance the state's interest.
Again the Court hailed the virtues of commercial
speech and, significantly, found the free flowing
marketplace of ideas at home in the marketplace of
commerce. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for
the 8-1 majority, "[the] commercial marketplace, like
other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides
a forum where ideas and information flourish."
Moreover, he added, even though that marketplace
contains ideas "of slight worth" in addition to those
that are "vital," "the general rule is that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented."
Consistent with this approach, Justice Kennedy
focused more pointedly on the state's burden in
Edenfield than the Court has ever done before.
Specifically, the Court provided bite for the notion
that "[the] party seeking to uphold a restriction on
commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it"
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by making clear that "[this] burden is not satisfied by
mere speculation or conjecture" on by the conclusory
statements of government officials. "[Rather],"
Kennedy wrote, "a governmental body seeking to
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree."
Applying this standard, the Edenfield majority
struck down Florida's statute, citing the state's failure
to demonstrate that the law directly advanced its
interests in preventing fraud and overreaching and in
maintaining "the fact and appearance of CPA
independence."
If commercial speech was afforded broad
protection in Discovery Network and Edenfield, it
was dealt a blow in Edge. In that case, a slim 5-4
majority led by retiring Justice White upheld a
federal statute forbidding radio and television stations
from airing lottery advertisements in states where
lotteries are illegal.
Edge represents a setback for First Amendment
interests in at least three respects. First, the Court's
analysis of the requirement that the regulation
"directly advance" the state's interests leaves much to
be desired - particularly after Edenfield, which was
decided only two months earlier. In fact, there is no
mention of the state's burden and no citation to
Edenfield in the third-prong analysis. Far from
requiring hard evidence, the Court struck a
deferential pose, contenting itself with stating that it
had "no doubt that the [challenged] statutes directly
advanced the governmental interest."
Second, Edge seems rooted in the very sort of
informational protectionism that is contrary to deeply
rooted First Amendment values. As Justice Stevens
(who wrote for the majority in Discovery Network)
points out in his dissent, the holding of Edge brings
into question the principle established in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) -- where the Court
struck down a Virginia law prohibiting ads for
abortion-related services in New York City -- that a
state may not, under the guise of protecting its
citizens' welfare outside its borders, suppress truthful
information within its borders regarding a legal
activity in another state.
Gambling Ties
Third among the setbacks in Edge is Justice
White's attempt to breathe life into Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328 (1986), the much-criticized
commercial-speech decision in which the Court's
majority put forth the view that "the [state's] greater
power to completely ban [certain conduct] necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising" related
to such conduct. That view - turning on its head
standard First Amendment jurisprudence, which
views limitations on speech as far more dangerous
than limitations on commercial conduct - was
repeated in Edge. Although the Court's dictum in
Edge makes only a few loose references to similar
dictum in Posadas without sustaining any meaningful
analysis, its citation of the case (in lieu, for example,
of Discovery Network) is troubling.
Fortunately, the Court was also quick to point out
that Posadas, like Edge, involved advertisements
concerning gambling - an activity that, in the Court's
view, "falls into a category of 'vice' activity that
could be, and frequently has been, banned
altogether." Paired in this fashion, the coupling of
Edge and Posadas may have more to do with their
relationship to a common "vice" that continues to stir
historically paternalistic impulses than with the
Court's desire to signal a broad retreat from existing
commercial-speech protections.
In terms of advancing commercial-speech
jurisprudence. Edge offers a single important
clarification concerning the proper focus of the last
two steps of commercial-speech analysis. The Court
explained that in conducting an inquiry into whether
a given regulation directly advances the state's
interests, "the question cannot be answered by
limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental
interest is directly advanced as applied to a single
person or entity." Instead, the inquiry must focus on
whether a general application of the statute will
advance the asserted interests. The Court concluded
by stating that, although a statute's application to
individual litigants is not irrelevant, it should be dealt
with under the fourth factor of the Central Hudson
test.
Finally, the tone of Edge is markedly different
from that of both Discovery Network and Edenfield.
In Edge, there are no celebratory refrains lauding the
value of commercial speech. There is instead the
crabbed tone all too typical of the Court when it
disdains commercial speech. Indeed, if Edge were
the only commercial-speech opinion one read, one
would be struck by nothing so much as the ease with
which the state can trump even a presumptive
constitutional right.
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And yet, Discovery Network and Edenfield
outweigh Edge in importance. Significant
commercial-speech protection is here to stay; so, it
seems, is a continuing battle within the Court that
adds little to its jurisprudential luster.
Floyd Abrams is a partner at New York's Cahill
Gordon & Reindel, where he specializes in First
Amendment matters, and a member of the National
Board of Contributors of American Lawyer Media,
L.P.
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AD LIMITS GET HARDER TO ENACT
BY CLAUDIA MACLACHLAN, National Law Journal Staff Reporter
Copyright 1993 The New York Law Publishing Company
The National Law Journal
July 26, 1993
STATE AND federal attempts to restrict
advertising of such so-called vices as tobacco, alcohol
and gambling are not likely to get any easier in the
wake of three inconsistent rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court on commercial speech, experts say.
Since 1976, when the Supreme Court first put teeth
into First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, there has been widespread dissension among
scholars, lawmakers and jurists concerning exactly
what kinds of commercial speech deserve protection
and how much regulation, if any, is constitutional.
Not surprisingly, the deep-seated ambivalence that
seems to characterize this debate extends to the
Supreme Court, which this term handed down three
commercial-speech decisions with two conflicting
messages. Two of the high court's rulings are
regarded as strongly protective of commercial-speech
rights. But the third generally is viewed as a setback
by advertisers and other proponents of unfettered
commercial speech.
"It has been very difficult for 15 years to square
one Supreme Court commercial-speech opinion with
another," said noted First Amendment litigator Floyd
Abrams of New York's Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
Already in the fray are Congress, some of whose
members are eager to regulate the advertising of
food, tobacco and other products, and even billboards
in outer space; state legislatures, some of which are
worried about the effects of alcohol and gambling on
- their citizens; and the Federal Trade Commission,
whose official rechartering by Congress has been
blocked for more than a decade because of
commercial-speech concerns.
"The great difficulty in commercial speech is, how
safe can you really make advertising," said Robert S.
Peck, legislative counsel to the American Civil
Liberties Union. First Amendment law, he
explained, rejects notions of safety in political
speech, the most protected of all speech. The
question is, he asks, "How much of that can we
import into commercial speech regulations?"
Short Shrift
Commercial speech - speech proposing an
economic transaction - historically has been given
short shrift under the First Amendment. For example
in 1942 the Supreme Court held that ads were not
entitled to First Amendment protection.
But by 1976, the court had changed its mind,
holding that consumers had an interest in commercial
information that "may be as keen, if not keener by
far, than their interest in the day's most urgent
political debate." Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748.
Since that ruling, which one lawyer called
commercial speech's "Magna Carta," lawyers say
they have seen a slight but steady erosion of
commercial-speech rights. The low point, according
to commercial-speech advocates, was reached in
1986, when the court held that Puerto Rico could ban
some types of gambling advertising, based on its
right to bar casino gambling entirely. Posadas de
Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328.
Two for Three
Given the court's somewhat erratic history in
commercial-speech cases, business lawyers, civil
liberties groups and First Amendment scholars were
anxious to see what the court would do with the three
cases it had this term. In the end, advocates of
commercial speech rights went two for three.
* In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
91-1200, the court held that Cincinnati officials could
not force the publishers of advertising circulars to
remove their newsracks from crowded city streets
while allowing other publications to remain. "The
city's selective and categorical ban on the
distribution, via newsrack, of 'commercial handbills'
is not consistent with the dictates of the First
Amendment," the court said.
* In Edenfield v. Fane, 91-1594, the court said
that certified public accountants had a right to solicit
clients. "In denying CPAs and their clients the
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considerable advantages of solicitation in the
commercial context, Florida's law threatens societal
interests in broad access to complete and accurate
commercial information that the First Amendment is
designed to safeguard," the court held.
* In the most controversial case of the term - U.S.
v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 92-486 - the court ruled
that a radio station licensed in North Carolina could
not broadcast Virginia lottery advertisements because
North Carolina prohibits lotteries and lottery
advertising. The Edge station is a few miles from
the Virginia-North Carolina border, and 92 percent of
its listeners are in Virginia.
On Edge
In a four-part opinion, the majority of it written by
now-retired Justice Byron R. White, the court held
that commercial-speech rights sometimes had to give
way to "legislative judgments" - and that in this
case, North Carolina's right to ban gambling
advertising within its state was paramount.
But the language in Edge that really worries
commercial-speech advocates, and which they
envision being used by those who want to ban alcohol
and tobacco advertising, deals with advertising and
demand:
"If there is an immediate connection between
advertising and demand, and the federal regulation
decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the
policy of decreasing demand for gambling is
correspondingly advanced."
First Amendment lawyer P. Cameron DeVore,
who represented Dow Jones & Co., Gannett Co. and
the American Civil Liberties Union in an amicus
brief supporting Edge, said the doctrinal divide
between cases such as Discovery and cases such as
Edge has produced two lines of arguments.
Mr. DeVore said Edge undoubtedly will be cited
by opponents of alcohol and tobacco advertising to
bolster their argument that those products are not
entitled to speech protection.
However, Mr. DeVore believes Edge is too narrow
and too peculiar to the federal laws regulating state
lotteries to permit extrapolation to tobacco or other
products. "I feel confident that a Congressional ban
on tobacco advertising does not pass muster under the
First Amendment," he said.
Disagreeing with Mr. DeVore is George
Washington University National Law Center Prof.
Ronald K. L. Collins, who says that Edge puts both
alcohol and tobacco advertising at risk of being
banned.
"Tobacco and alcohol advertising are clearly within
the purview of reasonable government regulation,
which would include even banning them," he said.
Professor Collins, co-founder of the Washington,
D.C.-based Center for the Study of Commercialism,
said the Edge decision stunned the advertising
community, which he said was hoping the court
would use the case to overturn the Posadas case.
Posadas scares even those who would support some
restriction of tobacco advertising, such as Ralph
Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group in
Washington, D.C.
"We would be very uncomfortable to see the
Posadas rationale applied to the sale of
pharmaceuticals," said David C. Vladeck, an attorney
with the litigation group. "One of the reassuring
things about Edge is that even though the solicitor
general urged the court to decide it on Posadas
grounds and presented it as a Posadas case, the court
decided it on other grounds," Mr. Vladeck said.
Waiting for Congress
Instead, the court turned to the four-part test it
designed in 1980 for assessing the constitutionality of
commercial-speech regulation, a test articulated in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557.
Professor Collins said, "The point is that Edge was
the case they were all watching because they wanted
to kill Posadas." Professor Collins" center favors
restrictions on computer-generated telephone
advertising and some advertising aimed at children.
He added that neither Edge nor Posadas will amount
to much if Congress continues to stall on restrictive
legislation.
For years Congress has been considering various
bills aimed at curtailing tobacco and alcohol
advertising. Some would disallow tax deductions for
tobacco advertising, while other measures, such as
this year's Sensible Advertising and Family Education
Bill sponsored by Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II,
D-Mass., and Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., would
force alcohol ads to contain health and safety warning
messages.
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The advertising community watches these bills
closely, using the familiar "slippery slope" argument
that legislation to restrict the so-called vices could be
used to regulate other products.
"First it was tobacco, then it was alcohol, which is
unquestionably good for you in small amounts; and
next it could be high-fat foods, high-sugar foods, and
you don't know where it stops," said Daniel E. Troy
of Washington, D.C.'s Wiley, Rein & Fielding. Mr.
Troy helped to draft amicus briefs in two of the
court's commercial-speech cases this year for several
media and advertising clients, including the American
Advertising Federation.
Pending Cases
The issue of whether advertising has any impact on
behavior - some studies say it doesn't, particularly
with tobacco use - is one that state and local
governments are wrestling with as they impose a
variety of restrictions on advertising of the so-called
vices - tobacco, alcohol and gambling - as well as
try to exert some control over food labelling and
nutrition claims.
Many First Amendment lawyers regard food
labeling as the next generation of commercial-speech
cases and are watching a California case, heading for
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, that Cahill
Gordon's Mr. Abrams is handling for a large group
of advertisers and food industries. The case,
Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren,
93-15644, challenges California's labeling laws,
which require products to meet specific standards
before advertisers can claim that they are
"ozone-friendly" or "biodegradable."
Another California case pending before the 9th
Circuit also is being watched because of its
commercial-speech implications. That case, Johnson
v. State Board of Accountancy, 92-16433, challenges
California's law that prohibits certified public
accountants who advertise from getting commissions
on selling financial products such as mutual funds or
annuities. Many states have similar prohibitions, but
some, such as Texas and Florida, are not enforcing
them, said Donald B. Verrilli, a partner in the
Washington, D.C., office of Chicago's Jenner &
Block, Mr. Verrilli is co-counsel for the plaintiff,
Ross Johnson.
Good Shape
Despite widespread attempts to regulate advertising
at both the state and local levels - particularly
tobacco advertising - most First Amendment scholars
agree that commercial-speech protections are in pretty
good shape.
The case that has exhilarated the First Amendment
bar is Discovery. "Discovery is probably the single
most supportive decision of commercial speech since
[Justice Harry A.] Blackmun wrote the Virginia
pharmacy case," said Mr. Abrams, referring to the
1976 case that protected commercial speech, Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748.
"It honors commercial speech," Mr. Abrams said.
He added that knowing who wrote the decisions has
become important in Supreme Court
commercial-speech cases, noting that Justice White
wrote Edge, while Justice John Paul Stevens wrote
Discovery.
"Justice White has never been enamored of
commercial speech," said Mr. Abrams, making a
point that almost every lawyer interviewed for this
article mentioned.
For that reason, speech advocates have been
plowing through Supreme Court nominee Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg's opinions, and they say they are
pleased with the results.
"To my knowledge, she has not written an opinion
in a significant case where a free-speech claim has
been denied," said Mr. Troy, who has been
researching Judge Ginsburg. "As a result, those of
us who are strong supporters of commercial speech
are mightily encouraged by her nomination."
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HATE CRIME LEGISLATION MUZZLES FREE SPEECH
BY STANLEY FEINGOLD
Copyright 1993 The New York Law Publishing Company
The National Law Journal
July 12, 1993
THE SUPREME COURT on June 11 unanimously
upheld Wisconsin's penalty enhancement law, Wis.
Stat. 939.645, which imposes harsher penalties on a
criminal who "intentionally selects the person against
whom the crime ... is committed . . . because of
the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person." Twenty-six other states and the District of
Columbia have similar laws.
In upholding hate crimes laws, the court has
recognized the threat that prejudice poses to the
public peace, but ignored the threat that such laws
pose to our liberty. It is possible to combat bigotry
without compromising liberty, but hate crimes laws
are not the way to do it.
Justice William H. Rehnquist's opinion in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 93= 515 (1993), goes counter
to the high court's tendency in recent decades to
restrict the extent to which offensive expression can
be punished. In almost every area of controversial
expression, including political advocacy, obscenity
and libel, the Supreme Court has defined more
narrowly the extent to which governments may
punish speech and expression.
This has even been true in the area of hate speech.
In response to increasing bigotry on campuses, many
colleges adopted speech codes that went beyond what
the Supreme Court had characterized as "fighting
words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
These restrictions prompted outcries that "political
correctness" was stifling the expression of unpopular
ideas. Lower federal courts voided
anti-discrimination speech codes at the universities of
Michigan and Wisconsin as overbroad and vague,
calling into question the similar codes at other public
and private institutions.
Any doubts as to where the Supreme Court stood
appeared to have been resolved last year when, in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992),
it voided a city ordinance as overbroad, because it
punished nearly all controversial characterizations
likely to arouse "resentment" among defined
protected groups, and under-inclusive, because the
government must not selectively penalize fighting
words directed at some groups while not prosecuting
those addressed to others.
Increased Penalty
The famous dictum of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. in which he defended "freedom for the
thought that we hate" has been repeatedly invoked by
the court in defending obnoxious expressions of
opinion. Although the punishment of hate speech
gained no support from the St. Paul decision, the
court has now concluded that hate crimes are
something else, and the penalty for criminal
conviction may be increased when an identifiable
group hatred inspired the crime. The distinction is
thus erased between motive (what the perpetuator
believes) and intent (what the perpetrator wants to
do).
The wanton brutality of Todd Mitchell and his
friends, who were all black, in assaulting an innocent
young man, who was chosen as their target because
he was white, deserved the full penalty of the law, as
would have any racially motivated crime. However,
increasing the penalty because of the beliefs of the
assailants opens a Pandora's box of proscribed hates
and presumed motives that will not easily be closed.
The logical next step will be to examine the
conversations, correspondence and other expressions
of the accused persons to determine whether a hate
motive prompted the crime.
To be consistent, legislatures must now includes
other hate categories, including sex, physical
characteristics, age, party affiliation,
anti-Americanism or position on abortion. If a hate
speech law that enumerated some categories is invalid
because, in Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion in St.
Paul, "government may not regulate use based on
hostility - or favoritism - toward the underlying
message involved," how can a hate crimes law be
upheld that increases the penalty for crimes motivated
by some hates but not those motivated by other hates?
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Majority Can Be Wrong
The effort to compel belief is not only wrong; it is
futile. There is no evidence that hatred is reduced by
laws forbidding beliefs or by punishing more severely
crimes committed by those professing these beliefs.
Those who disagree with the court's decision and
would punish only criminal actors and not hateful
speakers should take heart in recalling that other
unanimous and near-unanimous Supreme Courts have
been wrong, and later set right. Decisions have
denied the right of free expression with only one or
two dissents; often there would have been none but
for the presence of a few libertarian justices from
Mr. Holmes and Louis D. Brandels to William J.
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. But no such
uncompromising champions of free expression now
sit on the U.S. Supreme Court.
Only three years after the court upheld
Pennsylvania's compulsory flag salute law, in the
1940 case Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, the sole dissenter was joined by a new
member and three switch justices, leading to the
rejection of a similar law in West Virgina. West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
The new justice, Robert H. Jackson, wrote the
opinion in language that is pertinent now: "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not
now occur to us."
A Supreme Court that maintains it is not punishing
disapproved belief when it enhances criminal
punishment because of that belief can also argue that
it does not seek to compel approved belief.
However, we are still free not to believe it.
Special to The National Law Journal; Mr.
Feingold, for many years on the political science
faculty at City College of New York, now teaches at
Westchester Community College in Valhalla, New
York.
205
HIGH COURT RULES BUSINESS SOLICITATION IS A RIGHT
FREE SPEECH: JUSTICES STRIKE DOWN A FLORIDA LAW
FORBIDDING ACCOUNTANTS FROM SEEKING OUT NEW CLIENTS IN PERSON.
By DAVID G. SAVAGE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
April 27, 1993
The Supreme Court, in a ruling that extends
free-speech rights to certain business practices, on
Monday struck down a Florida law that barred
accountants from soliciting new clients in person.
On an 8-1 vote, the justices said that accountants,
like other professionals, have a constitutional right to
convey "truthful, non-deceptive information" about
their businesses.
The ruling likely invalidates similar laws from
Texas, Minnesota and Louisiana. These measures are
based on the view that, because accountants must
make objective judgments about a company's
finances, they should not be permitted to aggressively
sell themselves to clients.
But in recent years, the justices have insisted that
the First Amendment
protects advertising and solicitations, as well as
traditional political speeches and pamphlets. Just last
month, the court struck down a Cincinnati ordinance
that banned sidewalk news racks containing
magazines loaded with real estate ads.
The court opinion rejected the city's defense that
advertising always should be accorded a "lesser
protection" under the First Amendment.
In Monday's opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
expressed strong support for what lawyers label
"commercial speech."
"The commercial marketplace, like other spheres
of our social and cultural life, provides a forum
where ideas and information flourish. Some of the
ideas and information are vital, some of slight
worth," Kennedy said. "But the general rule is that
the speaker and the audience, not the government,
assess the value of the information presented."
But the court stopped short of overturning a 1978
decision that upheld an Ohio law forbidding lawyers
from directly soliciting business from victims of an
auto accident.
Unlike the classic ambulance chaser, accountants
will be speaking to "sophisticated and experienced
business executives" who are "far less susceptible to
manipulation than the young accident victim" in the
1978 case, Kennedy said.
The case decided Monday began in 1985 when
Scott Fane, a New Jersey certified public accountant,
moved to Florida.
He specialized in providing tax advice to small
businesses and had built his practice by soliciting
clients in person.
But the Florida Board of Accountancy prohibited
CPAs from "any direct, in-person, uninvited
solicitation" of customers. Believing that his
free-speech rights had been violated, Fane filed a suit
in federal court seeking to have the regulation struck
down.
A federal judge agreed and invalidated the rule, as
did an appeals court in Atlanta. The Justices agreed
to hear the case (Edenfield vs. Fane, 91-1594), but
only Justice Sandra Day O'Connor sided with the
state. In her view, the government may regulate
"pure profit seeking" by business persons.
In his opinion concurring with the majority, Justice
Harry A. Blackmun chided his colleagues for not
going further and ruling that commercial speech is
entitled to the same constitutional protection as
speech about public affairs.
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92-1450 WATERS v. CHURCHILL
Employees-Retaliatory dismissal-Comments
on matter of public concern-First Amendment-
Immunity.
Ruling below (CA 7, 977 F2d 1114):
Public hospital that fired employee for criti-
cism, later found to be protected under First
Amendment, of hospital's cross-training program
for nurses may be liable for violating employee's
free-speech rights, even if hospital had insuffi-
cient knowledge about precise content of employ-
ee's speech because of inadequate investigation of
employee's conduct.
Questions presented: (1) May public employer
that terminates employee based on credible, sub-
stantiated reports of unprotected, insubordinate
speech be held liable for retaliatory discharge
under First Amendment if it is later shown that
reports were inaccurate and that employee actu-
ally spoke on protected matters of public concern,
when employer's ignorance of protected speech is
result of incomplete investigation? (2) Were pub-
lic officials, in January 1987, immune from liabil-
ity for discharging employee based on credible,
substantiated reports of unprotected, insubordi-
nate speech that were later shown to be inaccu-
rate-because (a) it was clearly established that
insubordinate speech was not protected by First
Amendment and (b) it was not clearly estab-
lished that public officials had duty to investigate
beyond interviewing reporter of speech three
times and recipient of speech once and allowing
discharged employee opportunity to discuss
speech in question?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/8/93, by Donald
J. McNeil, Lawrence A. Manson, Dorothy Voss
Ward, Janet M. Kyte, and Keck, Mahin & Cate,
all of Chicago, Ill.
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The nation's cable industry urged the U.S.
Supreme Court to grant it full First Amendment
status last week when the cablers appealed a lower
court's ruling upholding the meat of the 1992 Cable
Act.
"The basic principals of the First Amendment -
the belief that government should not decide who
may speak or what they may say - are no less
applicable to new forms of speech than to old forms,"
the appeal, filed late Friday, read. "The (lower
court's decision) marks a serious departure from
those principles and warrants plenary review by this
Court."
Cablers told the high court that there is really no
distinction between what they do and what
newspapers, broadcasters, film studios and book
publishers do.
"There is no difference between cable television
and those media given full protection that would
justify allowing the government to dictate the content
of speech that must be provided by cable television
to its subscribers," the appeal states.
The appeal, filed by 17 cable entities including
Time Warner Entertainment, Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Daniels Cablevision, USA Network and the
National Cable Television Assn., contends that a
three-judge panel erred when it upheld the
must-carry" provisions of the law this spring.
"The district court clearly got off on the wrong
foot by treating must-carry law as 'simply an
industry-specific antitrust and fair trade regulatory
legislation,' " cable attorneys argued.
In 1992, Congress approved, over then-President
George Bush's veto, the cable law, which, among
other things, allows broadcasters to demand that
cable companies carry their signal or to negotiate for
payments to allow cablers to retransmit that signal.
In April, a three-judge panel here on a 2-1 vote
decided that the law was constitutional because it
regulated economic activity rather than speech. The
major cable companies in May filed notice that they
would ask the Supreme Court to decide whether the
lower court is wrong and filed their appeal last week.
Fallout from approval of the act continued to take
its toll in Washington as NCTA chief Jim Mooney
resigned last week (HR 7/2). And while he rejected
the notion that it forced him out, it has been widely
speculated that the bill's approval was a major factor.
In its appeal, cable television claims it was
wrongly singled out by Congress, contending that
lawmakers decided to restrict their speech.
Using the lower court's logic, the cablers argue
that the earlier ruling could allow the government to
"direct every newspaper to commit a section of its
pages to the publication of material submitted by
particular writers, or compel bookstores to carry a
specified amount of works published by 'local'
authors, or movie theaters to show films produced by
designated movie studios."
They reject the contention that the regulations are
economic in nature contending that the government is
making cable a second-class citizen by saying
broadcasters are a preferred speaker.
"(I)t is simply not the business of the government
to reorder the private marketplace for speech,
commanding that certain speakers be left to fend for
themselves," the attorneys wrote. "Whether the
government legislates discrimination because it
prefers certain speech, or just because it prefers
certain speakers, does not change the illegitimate
nature of the intrusion."
Broadcasters have benefited from the advent of
cable, blowing the argument that cable is a
"bot-tleneck" that can choke off broadcasters access
to viewers, they argue.
"Far from being imperiled, in fact broadcasting has
flourished," the cablers contend, noting that there are
now 1,118 commercial broadcast stations, a 22
percent jump since 1986, and 363 educational
stations, a 15 percent increase over the same time.
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'This significant expansion took place at least
partially because of the growth of cable television,
the appeal states.
The Supreme Court will decide whether it will hear
the case sometime this year. If it does, it will likely
take the court until next year to hear the case.
Meanwhile the FCC has already begun implementing
the act, having approved its rules governing
must-carry and retransmission consent earlier in the
year.
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